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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
u:.\H HICIUNS, 
Plain ti f !-Appellant, 
vs. 
Tl I l'~ IXDl'STHIAL COl\lMISSION OF 
l "'L\H, < )TTO A. vYIESLEY, CARLYLE 
I' ('l\O>iNING and JOHN R. SCHONE, 
it~ t'H)mhPrs, and RICHARD G. 
:.I ITl 1 !!ELL, 
Def endants-Respandents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, 
RICHARD G. MITCHELL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No.10852 
Appellant's Statement of Facts should be amended 
l1y adding the following facts: 
Leah Richins, appellant, was hired as a hostess by 
lhpo1H1ent, Mitchell, in his capacity as a eourt-appointed 
rPreinT of a husiness owned by Loreu Nelson and Edith 
1 
Nelson doing business as Day-Nite Launderceut, . ( r .\, 
33 at 3330 South ..Main Street, ~alt Lake Ci tr r" . 
... ' -- lc..1 
Nelsons' business was a self-service operation, usu,iJ,. 
requiring only a hostess on duty to a:-;:;ist tlH' patrriii~. · 
On February 18, 1963, the l\ el sons (·onrnw 11~eJ ,11 
action against the Day-Nite Coin-Op Dry Cleaning :ii 
the District Court of Salt Lake County :;eeking uarna~i:, 
for an alleged breaell of warranty as to l'ertain dry ch·au 
ing machines purchased b)· the Nelsons from tlw IJ,,, 
Nite Coin-Op Dry Cleaning. Coin-Op ai1swered anJ cou:
1 
terclaimed seeking payment in full on the machine~ r1r 
the return of the same under the terms of a conditimw
1 
sale contract. Day-Nite Franc-hise Distributors then •'n-
tered the action as a third part~· plaintiff seeking· from 
the Nelsons, as third party defendants, payment for, r1r 
the return of, certain laundry machines sold by snci1 
plaintiff to the Nelsons under a conditional sale contrad. 
The N el·sons had fallen behind in their payments, hut 
were eontinuing the use of the drycleaning and laundry 
maehines in their said business. 
Pursuant to a stipulation between the District Cour: 
litigants, the Court, on March 29, 1963, ordered that tht 
business be placed in the hands of a receiver, namely 
Richard G. Mitchell, respondent herein, who was au-
thorized to take possession of the rnaf'hines and run the 
business as a receiver until the further or<ler of the 
Court. 
Upon becoming receiver, .Mitchell immediately 
2 
, :i,·!Jl'd up a liauk a('couut for the n•(·ciYeL;hip funds in 
·i',, \ c1lle:» ~tale Bank in South Salt Lake, through which 
i' .1111 nt ail receipts and expenses of tlie re(·eiYcrship 
:,ij·:lll'"" \H'H' exclusively channeled during the entire 
1
,, ,i11d ol' the re<'eivcrs!Jip, indncling the \rnge payments 
1
, l.1·ah Hi,.Jiins. All that -:\Iifrhcll or Rirhins did in the 
;,n-i111's" from ,\pril 1 to Nonmber 30, 1963, was in 
1 ,'1 h•rnncr> of the ln1siness in receivership, and hoth 
.·i<'('ind t11eir pa,v from the receivership. 
Frnm tile time tlrnt Leah Hicliins was employed 
.\rl'il ~. lrHi:1, ,;he knew that she was workinp; for the 
1,.,.,.,,-1 r:;hip, or for nlitchell in his capacity as receiver. 
~l1•.' '";1..: i11jurcd July 2, 196:~, and was off work for ap-
111·"\;lllntrly one hour on .Jnl,v 2, during "·hieh time she 
11,1..: ,111endrcl at the hospital for a laceration on her head . 
. \: no tinw thereafter during the time of the receivership 
11·11s ~hc off work as the result of the injury. Nor, during 
this 1ime. did she tile a claim under the ·workmen's 
1. ompensa ti on Act. 
On December 23, 1963, the Court entered its Order 
di.,c]1arginQ' 1litchell as reeeivcr as cf November 30, 1963, 
:tlli1 ordering him to deliver the dryeleaning and laundry 
marhine-; into the hands of the Day-Nite Coin-Op Dry 
C'll'nning and the Day-Nite Franchise Distributor·s, re-
·'PP(·tiYely, and to file his accounting of the receivership 
'']ll'ration with the Court, all of "·hich he did in Decem-
hrr, 106::3. 
RH1i11~ filec1 her ·workmen's compensation claim 
3 
aga~ns t .:\li khell in his pernoual ca pal'i ty .J uue l ~. 
1 
!Ii,, 
or six mouths after the conrt liad tc1·minatcd u
1
, . . · 
l I 01\" 
ership. · 
The Stipulation npon which tl1e Court lm~c·, 
Order appointing Mitchell receiver is as follows. 
The plaintiffs, Loren Nelson anJ EditJ
1 
\, 
s'ion, by and through their attorney, Lawrenc~ i. 
Summerhays, and defendant, Day-Nite Cuin-1.1, 
Dry Cleaning, and als·o Day-Nitc Fra11chi~e ]li: 
tributors, by and through their attorney, A. Par; 
Smoot, hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. That, beginning April 1, 196:3, thp bn,.i 11 ~" 
of the plaintiffs, as set forth in their Complain: 
located at 3330 South Main Street, Salt Lab 
City, Utah, under the name of Day-~ite Laund;·r 
center No. 33, which business includes self-serric·i· 
laundry and dry cleaning, shall be placed in 1:· 
hands of Richard G. Mitchell, who resides at 2~1S11 
East 21st South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as R1--
ceiver of such business, whose duties shall be a~ 
follows: 
a. To operate all the laundry and dry rleai> 
ing equipment therein located, which equipmen 
is referred to in plaintiff's Complaint and in f]J,. 
Third Party's Complaint and said description, 
are hereby made a part hereof by this reference. 
b. To receive and control all moneys accru· 
ing from the operation thereof. 
c. From such receipts to pay all expenses,-,; 
the ·opera ti on of such business, including rent 'n 
the building, the payments on the installation loa1: 
to Valley State Bank, utilities, insurance, prop-
erty and sales taxes, swamp cooler payments. 
4 
e'\pcnse of hostess, adYertising, maintenance and 
a11y mid all expenses invoked in the running of 
:--nid ]J11si11ess, including a reasonahlc fee for the 
recei\'cr's own services. 
d. To use the supply of pcrC'hlorethelvne and 
(ltlwr d1(•mical supplies now on hand and which 
lil'lo11g to the plaintiffs, and to pay the Nelsons 
t Jierdor the reasonable Yalue thereof as such sup-
plil·S are used; when sueh supplies that are now 
on lian<l arc exhausted, the Receiver shall be free 
\ o p n rc· lrnse like supplies as and where he sees fit. 
J>:1n1wnt of supplies shall be made on or hcfore 
August 1, 1963. 
e. To permit the Nelsons to observe the con-
1li1io11 of the clothes as they come from the dry 
,.Jeanillg machine on condition that sai(l ReceiYcr 
ma.1· terminate such right if, in his judgment, the 
e:-..ercise thereof by the Nelsons results in cus-
tonwr or employee harassment or is threatening 
any loss or hindrance of the said business. 
f. To keep accurate records of all repairs 
made on any of the machines. Repairs to be made 
only during regular hours of operation. 
g. To operate and receive moneys from the 
coc·a cola machine on the premises which belongs 
to the Nelsons, and to make the monthly payments 
required on the machine from such moneys. The 
said :Jiitchell shall keep an accounting of all mon-
eys reeeived from the machine and shall, after all 
expenses and payments on the same are made, 
retain the profits, if any, for disposition by the 
court. It is understood that whatever rights the 
:Nelsons haYe as to the ownership of the machine 
shall remain in them. 
2. The Receiver shall keep an accounting of 
5 
the relation of receipts to expenses in th" 
t . f th d 1 · · ' op~r. ion o . e ry r eanmg maclunes as distinrr1 · .· 
f . ·1 . . ,.., ll'JJ•ii rom a s1m1 ar ac:ounhng- :v111_C'h he shall Illa~ .. ,,· 
the laund~y marhm.es, and if, m his judgment. 
1
:. 
dry rleanmg m~chmes are not making- a prnf:'. 
or appear not likely to make a profit, he may • 
his discretion, terminate the operation of·,'., 
machines and continue to operate only the i;;~ 1 
dry equipment. · 
3. All profits, if any, from the operation •ir 
such business by the ReceiYer shall he reta~ 1101 
and possessed by him until the dispositio11 there·;: 
shall be determined b>· the above entitled. eour: 
and the court shall also determine the term .1,' 
duration of the ReceiYership. 
4. This Stipulation is made subjed to the an 
proval of the said court, and it is hereby forth~~ 
stiplated that the Receiver may, if the cour 
agrees, act without bond. 
L. L. Summerhays 
Attorney for PlaintiffE 
A. Park Smoot 
Attorney for Defendant 
The Order of the Court follows: 
ORDER 
Having read the foregoing Stipul~tio~, anr; 
good cause appearing, and upon apphc~t1on °: 
defendant Day-Nite Coin-Op Dry Cleanrng ano 
Day-Nite 'Franchise Distributors, it is hereby 
6 
OHDEHE~D, ADJUDGED A:\'D DECREED 
that Hicharcl _U. ~litehell he, and he is hereby, ap-
poi11tl'<l Receiver of the Day-Nite Launclercenter 
~n. ;;;), loeatecl at 3330 South ~lain Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, to act without bond, and is 
!,!ranted all the rights and powers set forth in the 
LHegoing Stipulation which is hereby adopted 
arnl made a part of this Order. The term of said 
Order shall eontinue until further order of this 
Court. 
Dated this 29th clay of March, 196:~. 
BY THE COURT: 
STE"WART M. HANSO~ 
Judge 
T1w ( )rcler of the Court discharging Mitchell as 
b',•cti\"t!r is as follows: 
Based upon the within Stipulation and Mo-
tion of Dismissal with Prejudice and for Termi-
llation of Receivership and Discharge of Re-
c·eiver, and upon good cause appearing, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the plaintiff's Complaint, the defendants' 
Counterclaim and the Third Party Complaint, all 
on :file herein, be, and they are hereby, dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits, each party bear-
ing hi" own costs. It is further 
ORDERED, AD.JUDGED AND DECREED 
that Richard G. Mitchell, the Receiver of the 
properties herein involved, be, and he is hereby, 
ordered to transfer, as of the close of business on 
?\ ovemher 30, 1963, all of the dry cleaning ma-
7 
chines and equipment i11 his possession to ti , 
1 
fendant, Day-Nite Coin-Op Drv Cleaninrr 
11
:
1
'" 
.; t" anii r 
transfer all of the laundry machines an(l ., " 
t . l . . (11,111, men m us possess10n t,o the third partv <" · 
plainant, Day-Nite Franchise Distrihm
01
:, ini 
shall file his accounting of receipts and ex
1
;('111j 
tures of the said business operation from ~\pril 
1 1~?3, to November 30, 1~63, and that upon h. 
f1lmg thereof, together with the filing of nwin;. 
by Day-Nite Coin-Op Dry Cleaning- and na,.~::. 
Franchise Distributors showing receipt hv. tlit·t· 
respectively of the said machines and equipment 
that the said Richard G. Mitchell shall be. and j
1
" 
is hereby, diseharged as said Receiver. 
Dated this ....... day ,of November, 1963. 
BY THE COURT: 
STE'\Y ART M. HANSO\ 
.Judge 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RICHARD G . .MITCHELL AS RECEIY-
ER IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO CLABIA.:IT 
RICHINS FOR HER INJURIES. 
Appellant argues that Mitchell is personally Iiabh 
because: 
1. A receiver may be an employer under the "·ork-
men's Compensation Act. 
2. A receiver may be personally liable in a contraf''. 
8 
.. :i\t'lt'tl into l1y him without thl' :-;anction of the Court. 
:;. "Denial of plainliff 's claim \\·ould han• a ('Urion:-; 
:i:id inequitable result." (p. 11 of Brief) 
\\·l. answer the foregoing assertions 111 their order 
:;· 111ilows= 
1. \Y c rcauily concede that a receiver may he an 
, 111,:o.n•r, li11t ha:-;ten to :idd that under the facts of this 
, : 1,, \Jit«i1c~ll was an employer in his eapaC'it:' as a re-
, t ii t·r TliL· is:rne here is whether liahility, if any, runs 
:1:.::11n,;1 .\litc·hell pcrso11all;, or against Mitchell in his 
,;111:1,.in· a" recei,,er only. Every anthority cited by ap-
,.,.1':111! 011 this point, wheu applied to the fads of this 
:1·' .. t1rnit the liability of a receiver to his capacity as a 
1, r··· inr ha!·kecl up only h:' receivership assets. They 
urt lw· stress the rule that any action against the re-
' inr liy an emplo:'ee must be commenced against him 
1111ri11Q,· the receivership, not thereafter. After the re-
reinrship an employee may look only to the entity into 
1ri1ose harnls the husiness assets of the receivership have 
:wen placed following the discharge of the receiver, if 
there are any snch assets. If not, the employee is without 
a remedy. 
Appellant eites the l\Iichigan ease of Bredeweg v. 
First 8tatr Bank of H olla11rl, et al, 27.'l N. W. 556 (1937). 
This wa« a case where the injured employee sued three 
h:mh. which had been in receivership, for injuries re-
r·r·in•d ns an emplo;,ee of the receiver during the receiv-
9 
ership. His suit was to obtain workmen\ c·om}Jc• .. 
n,.it:"· 
against the banks after the assets were rdurried 1,, " 
banks following the terminatio11 nf the rec·c·;n,rsl · ·r·· ' . 11]1 ' 
:Michigan Court in stating the probll'm and thn . 1 , . 
' ~IJ, \! I· I' 
thereto quotes from the ease of Bartlett Y. Cicrrr) J,
1 
;I 
H d': P Company, 177 Ill 68, 5:2 XE :;39, 4.? i,JU ; 1~ , 
follows: '" 
"The main question presented " • • • i~ th' 
\Yhere a corporation has been placed in the ha;:;< 
of a receiver, and an injury or death has he~· 
eaused hy the negligence of the recriYer whil~ 1. 
is operating the property of the corporation; ai: 
where, by stipulation between the partie:', tlw r;. 
ceiver is discharger!, and the propert:· is restor1·•: 
to the possession ·of the corporation, can thr 1·r~ 
poration itself be hel<l liable for damages for:::, 
injury so received during the receivership. • • • · 
''The receivers in such cases are not personal!. 
liable upon their discharge for claims of tLi-
character, but the claims follow the property 11'. 
fund which alone can be used to satisfy the1> .. 
• • • • Not merely claims arising out of contract,. 
but claims for torts, arising through the negli· 
gence of the receivers or their subordinates, thu, 
follow the property or fund. 
"In the case at bar, if the plaintiff has no remed1 
for the death of his intestate against the eon,. 
pany, then he has no remedy at all, inasmuch a' 
the receiver, during whose administration thr· 
death occurred, has been discharged from his of· 
fice, and cannot be held personally liable." 
The Court in the Bredeweg case then quotes further 
from the Bartlett case which in turn quotes from 
10 
1/,,,mv'u111111 ('orpuratin11s as follows: 
• · 'Tl1l' reC'eivcr lwcomL'S the 11ew custodian of a 
property whil'h \\·as before, in a sense, a trust 
property in the hands of the corporation. In the 
management of this trust property negligences 
11 re eommi tted by his servants, for which, under 
the :-:ettled pri11C'iples of law, the receiver is liable-
11ot personall~-, cxeept where he has been guilty of 
pPr:-:onal fanlt,-but out of the trust funds in his 
hm1rk The lial)ilit~- then is essentially the liabil-
ity of the fnncl and not of the custodian. \Yhen, 
t ]1(')'efore, the fund is transferred to a new trus-
t Pe, \\·hether it he to a new and reorganized eor-
11oratio11 C'reatecl by the purchasers at a mortgage 
,,c1Jr>. " * * *or whether it be the original corpora-
tion, its former owner, to whom it is re-delivered 
1rnder a new management, it is the ease of a trust 
property, to which a liabilit~- has attached, pass-
inp; into the hands of a new trustee. The trust 
property continues liable; hut from the very na-
ture of the case, any action brought to charge it 
must, if the receiver has been discharged prior to 
the bringing of the action, be brought against the 
corporation which is its custodian, that is to say, 
against the new trustee.' '' 
Thus, "the liability is essentially a liability of the 
fnnd, and not a liability ·Of the custodian'', and if suit 
is not brought against the receiver during the receiver-
ship. it must he brought, if at all, against the entity that 
now has custody of the business property formerly 
Pwned and operated within the receivership. The plain-
tiff Bredeweg properly sued, not the discharged receiver 
- although the injury occurred in the employment of the 
11 
receiver and during the receivership -- but . 
1 ~UP1 I) 
banks into whose hands the properfr had hep 11 r t . • . (l lltlli',i 
and succeeded by reason of the principles abor
11 
". 
forth. - , 
Appellant next cites the case of Unrinr: r. ,\mi;. 
Northern R. Co., ct al, 104 K a11. 236', 178 [> 6'14. TJ11·. ,, ,"I ~d ,, 
supports the rule that "receivers were an · emplo)l'' 
within the provisions of the W orkrnen 's Compensa:
11
,; 
Act", with ·which rule we agree. rrhe point at i:c,~ue in (J![I 
case, however, was not dealt with clirc•dly in the f'il 1·1;, 
case but it is important to note that daima11t madf' l!· 
claim during the receivership, ancl there is nothing in rj 
case to suggest that liability rests upon the 1weinr pi 
sonally. Since action was brought during the receir, r 
ship, the receivers had to be made partie:- defo1dw 
rather than the railroad eompany which had lost r·ontrr 
of the business to the receivers. A judgment against Iii' 
receivers during the time the business is operated a3 :. 
receivership involves receivership assets and not tb1 
receiver's personally. 
Appellant next cites 9.9 C.J.S. Workmen's Compr;1 
sation, Par. 40 and 55 and quotes therefrom the follow-
ing: 
'' • • • • one who makes a contract of employme111 
as a receiver is liable to the employee injured on 
the job. • • • *" 
If one reads the entire paragraph (Par. 40), from 
12 
\' i,j,·Ji flll' f(ln'goiHg extrad is taken, one finds further 
'Jil]'res~iH' ~upport for our position that a reeeiver is 
.. , t Tll lw hl'ld personally liable for employment l'On-
,1:1, ll'd Ii.'· a re<'eiver in his capacity as a reeei\·er. The 
,,,Jlil1riup: i:-; from Par. 40 of C.J.S.: 
· · _\11 employee is entitled to not ire of any change 
o:' vrnployC'r, and for eompensation purposes, can-
uot l1an· an employer thrust on him against his 
1Yill 11r without his knowledge. Thus, an employer 
r1·1uains liable for compensation for an injury oc-
1·11ni11g thereafter where without notiee to his 
ernployce he sells his business, assigns his con-
tract, or enters into secret agreements with an-
other as to the manner of operating the business; 
and one who makes a contract of employment as 
n receiver is liable as receiver to the employee in-
.imcd on a job taken by the receiver in his individ-
ual capacity without notice to, or knowledge by, 
the employee of the change in his employer's ca-
pacity." 
As support for the foregoing statement, C.J.S. cites 
the case of AJ1derson v. Polleys, 165 A. 436 (Rhode Is-
lnnrl 198.7). On March 2, 1931, Polleys was appointed 
receiver of the -William V. Polleys Company, a business 
Pn~aged in dock building and water front work. In June, 
1 ~J:-n. Anderson was employed by the receiver to do re-
r·eivership business on a job at Riverside. After four 
months, Anderson was ordered by Polleys to work on 
anoth~~r joh at Bristol. P,olleys failed to inform Anderson 
that the latter job was a personal job of Polleys which 
had nothing to do with the receivership job, and Ander-
13 
son thought he wa·s still working for tlie receiYe .. 1 .. . ls 1t)1, l 
fact Anderson bad made it known to Pollen, } .. 
• IC \\(JU,, 
not work for Polleys except in his receivership capa.· 
Three or four days after starting on the Bristol job, } 
derson was killed in the course of his employment Tl,, 
court held that Anderson was entitled to r·ompen~at;: 
from Polleys as a receiver backed by the n~cl'irer,;, 
assets rather than from Polleys personally becau.'v .\i 
derson was entitled to know of any change in hi, ~n 
ployer 's capacity. 
Ou p. 5 of Appellant's brief, the cases of Minc/ie
1
, ·, 
Huston, et al, 1.9:-J Geor9ia 272, 18 ;',1.E. 2d 4fi7 (J.94:
1 
u 
Mitchell V. Haines, 122 N. J. L. 292, :JA 2d 680 ( z.rn.9) ar 
cited in support of Appellant's point that receiYcrs :1 
employers under \V or km en's Compensation Act~. \\. 
agree with these cases. It ·should be noted that in Ji,,n, 
cases the receiver was a defendant during his tenure ;1· 
receiver with receivership assets available to suppor: 
the claim, and in the M i11che1c case the court specificai::, 
explains that a receiver "is subject in his repre·sentati1•: 
capacity to the provisions of the \Yorkmen 's Compen· 
sation Law * * * ". In the Mitchell case, the issue wa· 
raised by the receiver as to ·whether he could properl:· 
be sued as a receiver in view of the fact that he 11as il 
receiver of a National Bank and therefore a gowrn 
mental agent immune from suit. The Court was not im· 
pressed with the governmental immunity argument anc: 
held that, as receiver, he represented the assets of tht 
Bank, conserving the same "for the benefit of deposi· 
14 
:"r'. crl'ditor~, and :-;(oekhoklers, and in the perform-
:cJ!l'(' ,.f this fmwtion, the recei,·er in fact aets as an agent 
1
• , 1:c·Ji d1•po:-:itors, ereditors, and stoC'khoklers, and per-
111.1,, 11 d11t~· whid1 is not strictly a go\·ernmental func-
rn1 tl (' t dd "" • • · t · :i 11 , 1 ••• 1 ms, ie .om· a s: a receiver, s eppmg 
i: t<> rn1rnage the bank in order to provide an orderly 
,:qi:Hlation of its assets ancl the payment of its liabilities, 
.;:ii~ds in no better position than the hank itself. A 
, .i.1im"11! a,rwi11st the receiver can only affect the assets 
. /1•.' 11n,,,., .. ,·sio11 rc('eil'erl iii his official capacity, and in 
, ,11 [s1' affects the Pnited States Government." (our em-
: ,)J<l ~i.-) 
1'lw ease of Barker\'. Eddy, 97 Ind. 94, 185 N.E. 878 
1 .'.'',;) eited also on p. 5 of Appellant's brief is a case 
,, 111» r the issue raised h)· the parties was whether the 
1Jl':d h of an employee occurred in the course of an em-
1il1 ·.1·ce-employer relationship. The fact that the employer 
1.1a' ading as a receiver when the employee's death oc-
1 ll!Tell and whether he could be a defendant as a receiver 
1ras not an issue raised in the case. 
~. \Ve come now to the question as to whether the 
contract of employment of Richins by the receiver.ship 
11a~ sanctioned by the Court. The Court -0rder appointing 
~l;tehell and the stipulation upon which the Order is 
ha,ed speeifically authorizes the receiver to pay all ex-
J1Pnses in the operation of the business ineluding "ex-
:i<'nse of hostess" (par. l e) at the location of the busi-
lil"'~ at 3330 Sonth Main Street. Finally, the court ap-
pnwes the conduct ·of receiver and all that he has done 
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by discharging him 1mrsuant to stipulation of all 
parties involved upon his filing an aeeounting wii]; ., • 
eourt, which he did in December, 1%::. · 
In this phase of appellant's argument, a quiliaii. 
from Tardy's Smith on Receicers is giveu iu ~uppr!l', 
her position (page 10 of Brief). A C'areful pPrusa! ,,y 1:.: 
authority, rather than supporting appellant'~ \;, ,. 
really sustains the position taken h~· respoudPnt h·<'!'(•i! 
The following is taken from Par. :l8 of 1 his work 11,1 
J69-171) and includes the quotation found in app(llla!l; 
brief: 
"A receiYer is not individually liable on contra(·;. 
made by him in his official capacity under fr 
orders of the court. The only remedy whi('h i::. 
other eontracting party has under surh prnet·.·d 
ings must be sought in the receivership proee1·1l 
mg. 
"Persons con traeting with a receiver are ebarg-1:· 
able with notice that contracts made by him mu>' 
be authorized or ratified by the Court. A Cour: 
may modify or repudiate contracts made by it.· 
receiver without its sanction or approYal • • •' 
''A receiver may be personally liable in a ron· 
tract- entered into by him without the sanction of 
the court even though in relation to a matter 
~'hich otherwise would be a charge against the 
receivership. But a rereiver who is managing a 
receivership as a going roncern has implied power 
to make such reasonable contracts as are necfr 
sary for the proper management of the receirer· 
ship. * * * * Of course, it is not required that :1 
receiver should be obliged to go to court for all 
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ordl'r for e,·ery trifling matter. • • • • 
··The rnk• in short is, that if a reeeiver contracts 
ckhts on hehalf of the receiwr without having 
het•n authorized by the eourt or without his acts 
in so doiug having been ratified by the court, he 
"ill he personally responsihle to the creditors 
for 1 he debts so incurred, but if, however, he bas 
Jiecn prc,·iously authorized or his acts have been 
ratified by the eourt, the creditor will be obliged 
to l<>ok to the ref•eivership fund for payment un-
lP"" 1 !1e receinr has in his individual capacity 
~naranteed the debts.'' 
.\ 11 J1011gli appellant argues the point that ~litchell 
~1,r;Jle,; without court sanction and approval, there is 
.·;ilh· :1u :;n<'h factual issue raised in the reeord, nor is 
1: a dually asserted in their brief: and the faet remains, 
ti' ;1ppe;Hi' in the District Court record, that all that 
.\lit('hell did as a receiver \\'as sanctioned before and ap-
prr1n•tl after he did it: and at the conclusion of the re-
"t·ivership be was properly discharged by the court by 
an Order entered six months before appellant filed her 
claim "·ith the Industrial Commission. 
:\. Appellant argues that "denial of plaintiff's claim 
would have a curious and inequitable re·sult" {page 11) 
in that an impaired worker ''would have no right of re-
('(•nry," and further for the reason "that a receiver 
11·ho hires agents or employees to assist him in the con-
rluet of the business, without specific approval of the 
(·ourt, does so 'at bis peril' ". 
A:,: to the latter point, the receiver did have the ap-
17 
proval of the l'ourt in all that he did as rc•l'ei\·er T: 
was not a situation where the rec·cin•r w·H 't(·t· · .. 
'' ' 111['. Ii I 
personal business, or as a recei,·er actin" Ii(·\·. 
1 
... 
,.., '(}]Ji, 
scope of 11is receiYer:-:hip clutie,.;. Enrything lw thi '':. 
sanctioned by the tourt both hel'on~ and after 1hP ]J··r:. 
of the receiYersbip. 
The premise upon whic·h appella11t :-ugg·rH, . 
curious and i11equitable re:;;nlt'' appears to hp 1hat \i, 
chell is the only one upon whom Hiehins .. wonlJ ha"'· 
right of rel'o\·ery' '. Appellant's own authorities ch. 
her to seek help from those to whom the rcceirv 1.:. 11 
business or assets are return eel. In this case t hPn· .. 1, 1 
no assets except a settlement payment, gro\\·ing om 
the law suit ·which gaYe rise to the receinrship. wL1• 
payment went to the Nelsons. In this sense, the bn.-ii:-:" 
of the Nelsons, if any, was returned to the X elson~ .1· 
the time the receivership was terminated .. Appellant', 
cases give us the rule that she must look to that so11r·· 
after the receivership is terminated. And the Industria. 
Commission specifically so directed her in its Order. 
On page 11 of appellant's brief, we read "tlte pro:1 
erty and business transferred in the District Court pr1 
ceeding to the receivers was never returned to th. 
prior owners''. The legal title of the washing and dr:· 
cleanino- machines never belon£'ed to the Nelsons. the:: 
b ' ~ 
right to pos·session thereof had terminated prior to th 
receivership because of their failure to make thC' agree 1 
payments thereon. The business of the Nelsons wa~ 'ht:~ 
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:, 1111111 ,1ted al tlie ('011clusio11 of the reC'eiw'rship ou 
\,i,·riiiber :)0, 1063, h~· a simple abando11me11t thereof. 
\\.itJ;, 1u1 the rnaehines~ the use of which was their primary 
.. '''': j 11 thP lmsiness, they had no eourse but to replaee 
·)wm ,1r ahai1don the business. They chose the latter . 
. \!so 011 page 11 of appellants hrief, Wl' read: 
· · .\lthoup:h it subsequently de,·elope<l that de-
1'1•111la11t has no workman's e·ompensation insur-
a1H·t>, dcf'l'ndant :ititchell a<lvised the plaintiff that 
1:1sura11C'e was available." 
Jt ~lifrhell so advised her, it was 01ily hecause the 
\,·b1m~ or the Nelson's insurance agent had lead 1\litchell 
;,, l1rii1•Ye that the business had sneh insurance coverage. 
1 
[,• d1rl not learn otherwise until after .July 2, 1963. The 
, nwial fart remains, however, that appellant while work-
ing- for a reeeiver is limited in her claim to receivership 
assets either during the receivership or thereafter wher-
(•nr snC'h assets may be found. And if there are no 
.i~~rts, there is no justification or legal precedent to look 
to the rec·eiver personally for a remedy to appellant's 
aile;red loss. 
The court m the Bredeweg case states that "if the 
plaiutiff has no remedy *' *' *' *' against the company, then 
i1(· ha;,; no remedy at all, inasmuch as the receiver, during 
11 h0~P administration the death occurred has been dis-
, hargc<1 from his office, and cannot be held pers·onally 
1:alilc ". 
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POIXT II. ,\ PPJ<~LL,\XT S If Or LI> X()1' If.\ 
1
.
1 
A FULL IJEARIX<; F:\TJL Siii·~ ;\! ·\!\!·',: 1l . 
..i.. ...._ ~ ~" I !· 
CLAIM AGAIXST THE RWIJT P,\l{'J'Y . 
Respondent ('Oncedes that if appellant h:td 
11
;,,,. 
a proper party as defpmlant, thc•11 tl1is <"<hL· lia~ 11 ,, 11 ", 
fully heard . .Jfueh that is set forth i11 tl1p ~Llll·u 11111 ,. 
fads by both parties before the• court are not t'r 11 rn ;:. 
record, because a full record of facts has llL'\'t>r 1,.;1 
1Jeen made in this case. \\' e han~ hint Pd lwrPi 11 :rnd ,1 
assert that tl1e injury appellm1t suffered on .Jul~·~. ~·1 1 
is in no way <'OlllH:ciecl to the malad,\· slil' wi\r r.:: .. 
grew out of sneh injury. The Commission was n·ln11;, 
to investigate this phase of the case until elairn:1:11 . 
volved the proper defendant. A ctuall,\· therp wen• 1•i1n•i: 
facts appearing in the District Court record whi"J: i:1., 
cated to the Commission that ;\litc·hell \ms 1101 a11 ::· 
propriate defendant. and it apriears that tlw C'ornIL;· 
sion was strongly influenced by the District Conrt l'l'1·1Jri: 
in its deeision to have no further hearing 011 the ma'." 
until a proper and lawful defendant was inrnlnd. \ 
careful stndy of appellant's authorities appear~ t11 ,i;1· 
tify and support the Commission in this decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Although a receiver may be an employer for \Ynr~ 
men's Compen.sa ti on Act purposes, any workmen'~ c·•n · 
pensation claim against a reeeiYer must be in his re··r:., 
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, .. -Ill!' 1-;q\a('it.'· ha<'kl'<l h:· n•r·ein•rship assc•b, if any, 
''"! .10 : at.:"ai11st the receiver personally nor against his 
:'· r,,, 11 ;1 l assets. 
J wisrnucli as Leah Hi<'hins failed to file her claim 
1..:; 11 ,,,, tlw reccin'r in his rc<'eiYership <'apacity during 
;!'!' :,1. 1 iorl of the reccin•rship, her only remedy there-
. • 1• ;, a!.!'ain~t the entity into whose possession the re-
'·\, r--11;p as,;t>h were pla<'ed upon the termination of 
·I; l'l l"l'i\'Pl'Ship. 
_\lthn1gh there is perhaps much to he desired in 
·I,, 11·r·ord lwfore the <·ourt, it appears that there arc 
,;1tf'cirnt hasic facts either in the reeor<l or <·onecde<l by 
", !';1rtiei-l that sufficiently indieate the futility of a 
lit! I''' r hraring before the Commission as long as ap-
;11\i::nt seeks to hold ~litehell personally liahle for her 
;11r~ries, and the appeal to remand for any purpose 
,Ji,rnld therefore be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PARK SMOOT 
Attorney f.or Respondent 
847 East 4th South 
'Salt Lake City, Utah 
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